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Impact of Active Surveillance and Contact 
Isolation on Transmission of Methicillin-resistant
Staphylococcus aureus in Intensive Care Units 
in an Area With High Prevalence
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Tsung-Hsi Wang,5 Shan-Chwen Chang1*
Background/Purpose: Previous research has suggested that active surveillance and early initiation of
contact isolation (ASI) can control the nosocomial spread of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus
(MRSA), especially among intensive care unit (ICU) patients. However, these interventions have never
been implemented in Taiwan.
Methods: This study was conducted from September 2005 to October 2006 to evaluate the effect of ASI on
the spread of MRSA in two medical centers in Taiwan with a high prevalence of MRSA. One ICU from each
hospital was selected as a study site. In phase I (the first 6 months), only active surveillance was introduced.
In phase II (the final 6 months), ASI for patients who had positive MRSA cultures was implemented.
Results: The incidence of acquiring MRSA during ICU stay did not differ significantly during phases I
and II in hospital A (p = 0.940) and hospital B (p = 0.810). The independent risk factors for acquiring
MRSA in the ICU were length of stay and presence of respiratory tract diseases.
Conclusion: This study demonstrated that, given the current resource limitations, ASI alone could not
reduce MRSA transmission in two ICUs in Taiwan, where the MRSA prevalence was high.
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Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA)
is one of the main pathogens responsible for
nosocomial infections.1,2 Previous studies have
suggested that MRSA is not part of a patient’s
endogenous flora.3 Other studies have indicated
that acquisition of MRSA is associated highly
with subsequent MRSA infection.4 Prevention 
of transmission among hospitalized patients 
appears to be the major method for the control of
MRSA infection.3
Two major guidelines in the United States
have provided important recommendations for
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the control of MRSA transmission.3,5 These guide-
lines agree on many issues. However, there is one
major difference. The guidelines of the Society of
Healthcare Epidemiology of America recommend
the use of active surveillance of MRSA for all high-
risk patients, especially those who have stayed in an
intensive care unit (ICU).3 In contrast, the guide-
lines of the Centers for Disease Control and Pre-
vention Healthcare Infection Control Practices
Advisory Committee (HICPAC) recommend the
use of active surveillance of MRSA only after other
interventions have failed to control transmission.5
During the past 2 decades, many United States
hospitals have adopted the HICPAC recommen-
dations,6 but the incidence of MRSA infection
has continued to increase.1 It has been argued
that unrecognized MRSA carriers become contin-
uous sources of MRSA because they are not placed
in isolation. This has prompted some hospitals to
implement active surveillance for MRSA in target
patients.3,7 Although several studies have reported
that active surveillance successfully controls MRSA
infection,8–10 others have reported inconsistent
or negative results.11–14
A high proportion of MRSA (up to 80%)
among all nosocomial S. aureus isolates has been
noted in Taiwan.15,16 Taiwanese hospitals have fol-
lowed the HICPAC recommendations for many
years, but these have provided no obvious bene-
fits.17,18 In addition to the controversies concern-
ing MRSA-control guidelines, the effectiveness of
active surveillance and early initiation of contact
isolation (ASI) in an area with a high proportion
of MRSA among all nosocomial isolates of S. au-
reus has never been studied. In addition, some
adjuvant interventions such as rapid detection of
MRSA using polymerase chain reaction methods,
preemptive isolation, and bedside bathing using
chlorhexidine-containing solutions are not appli-
cable currently in Taiwan because of limitations in
resources and/or lack of acceptance by patients
and their families.7,14,19
We conducted the present study to investigate
the impact of active surveillance on the transmis-
sion of MRSA among high-risk patients in the
ICUs of two hospitals in Taiwan.
Methods
Hospital settings, patients, and study period
This study was conducted from September 1,
2005 to October 31, 2006 at two medical centers
(Hospitals A and B) in Northern Taiwan. These
two hospitals offered primary and tertiary care.
Hospital A had a capacity of 623 beds and four
ICUs (43 beds in total). Hospital B had a capac-
ity of 756 beds and three ICUs (59 beds in total).
The 13-bed medical ICU of hospital A and the
32-bed surgical ICU of hospital B were selected
as the study sites. The distance between bed cen-
ters in these two ICUs was at least 2.1 m. The pro-
portion of MRSA among all S. aureus that caused
nosocomial infections in both hospitals during
the past 5 years was around 85.4% and 86.3%, re-
spectively. The nosocomial MRSA infection rates
in the ICU of hospital A were 2.2, 1.4, 0.9, 1.4, and
0.9 per 1000 patient days from 2000 to 2004, re-
spectively. The nosocomial MRSA infection rates
in the ICU of hospital B were 1.75, 1.09, 1.71,
0.97, and 0.93 per 1000 patient days from 2000
to 2004, respectively.
Study protocol
The study was approved by the Institute Review
Boards of the two hospitals. This 14-month
study consisted of three phases: phase I (the first
6 months), wash-out phase (the following 2
months), and phase II (the last 6 months). Active
surveillance was performed in phases I and II.
The active surveillance procedures were as fol-
lows: (1) all patients who were in ICUs on the
first day of phases I and II had surveillance cul-
tures taken on day 1 of each phase; (2) patients
who were newly admitted to the ICU had sur-
veillance cultures taken within 24 hours of ad-
mission; (3) for all patients, surveillance cultures
were taken every 3 days and on the day that they
left the ICU; and (4) the culture sites of every sur-
veillance culture were the nostril,20–22 throat (or
sputum if the patient was intubated),23,24 axil-
lae,3 inguinal area,3 and wound (if present).21,22
During phases I and II, all healthcare workers in
the two ICUs were screened monthly for nasal
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carriage of MRSA. All culture swabs were sent 
immediately to the central laboratory at the Na-
tional Health Research Institute (Zhunan, Taiwan).
During phase I, the results of active surveil-
lance were not given to the healthcare workers.
Only infection control interventions suggested
by HICPAC, except those related to active surveil-
lance, were adopted in these two ICUs.5 Therefore,
in phase I, patients were placed in isolation only
when cultures of their clinical specimen yielded
MRSA and/or other multidrug-resistant bacteria,
or if they suffered from contagious diseases.
During the washout phase, an education program
(designed by three senior infectious diseases spe-
cialists) was used to train healthcare workers on
isolation procedures that would be adopted in
phase II. During phase II, patients who tested
positive for MRSA by surveillance and clinical
specimen cultures were put on contact isolation
immediately after the culture results were avail-
able. The procedures of contact isolation in phase
II were: (1) patients were moved to private rooms
or cohort areas as soon as possible; (2) non-critical
devices were used exclusively in those isolated
patients; (3) healthcare workers were instructed to
wash their hands with chlorhexidine-based dis-
infectants (4% w/v) or alcohol-based hand rubs
before entering and after leaving the private rooms
or cohort areas; (4) healthcare workers were in-
structed to put on gowns and gloves before en-
tering the private rooms or cohort areas; (5)
healthcare workers were instructed to take off
gowns and gloves after leaving the private rooms
or cohort areas; (6) the beds and surrounding en-
vironment were cleaned and disinfected with 0.5%
sodium hypochlorite after patient discharge; (7)
study assistants were instructed to monitor the
adherence of healthcare workers to procedures
3–5 twice daily; and (8) contact isolation contin-
ued until the patient was discharged.
Microbiology
Each swab was plated onto a sheep blood agar
plate, and a CHROMagar MRSA plate, after which
it was placed in a tube of enrichment (salt) broth
that contained 5mL Trypticase Soy Broth with 7.5%
NaCl. After overnight incubation, the enrichment
broth was subcultured on a CHROMagar S. aureus
plate. All plates were incubated at 35°C in ambient
air and were checked for the presence of S. aureus
and/or MRSA at 24 and 48 hours after incubation.
Isolates suspected to be S. aureus from sheep blood
agar were first checked by catalase and Gram stain if
deemed necessary, and all S. aureus was confirmed
by coagulase latex agglutination. S. aureus isolates
from blood agar plates and CHROMagar S. aureus
plates were spotted onto CHROMagar MRSA plates
to check for methicillin resistance, whereas con-
firmed S. aureus isolates from CHROMagar MRSA
plates were assumed to be MRSA.
All isolates were subcultured to a fresh blood
agar plate and stored at −80°C for subsequent
drug susceptibility tests. Susceptibility to chloram-
phenicol, ciprofloxacin, clindamycin, erythromy-
cin, gentamicin, linezolid, rifampin, teicoplanin,
tetracycline, trimethoprim/sulfamethoxazole, and
vancomycin was determined using the disc diffu-
sion method.25 All media and identification re-
agents were purchased from Becton, Dickinson
and Co., Franklin Lakes, NJ, USA), unless indi-
cated otherwise.
Data collection and definitions
A standardized case record form was used to
record demographic, clinical, and microbiologi-
cal data. The demographic data included patient
age and sex. The clinical data consisted of dates of
ICU admission and discharge, length of ICU stay,
Acute Physiology and Chronic Health Evaluation
II (APACHE II) score upon admission to the ICU,26
underlying diseases, recent operations, invasive
therapeutic procedures, and prior use of antimicro-
bial agents. The microbiological data included
the first date when a culture tested positive for
MRSA, and the body sites where positive cultures
were found. The prevalence of patients carrying
MRSA on admission and during their stay in the
ICU, as well as the incidence of MRSA transmis-
sion (newly acquired MRSA) during ICU stay
were recorded and compared.
The APACHE II scores were divided into low
and high groups, with a cutoff point of 17, as
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suggested previously.27,28 Initially, antibiotics were
classified into 15 groups: Group 1, penicillins
without anti-pseudomonal effect and not com-
bined with β-lactamase inhibitors; Group 2, anti-
pseudomonal penicillins; Group 3, penicillins
combined with β-lactamase inhibitors; Group 4,
first-generation cephalosporins; Group 5, second-
generation cephalosporins; Group 6, third-gener-
ation cephalosporins without anti-pseudomonal
effect; Group 7, third-generation cephalosporins
with anti-pseudomonal effect; Group 8, fourth-
generation cephalosporins; Group 9, carbapenems;
Group 10, monobactams; Group 11, glycopeptides;
Group 12, anti-anaerobic agents and antibiotics
with activity against atypical pathogens; Group
13, aminoglycosides; Group 14, antifungals; and
Group 15, fluoroquinolones. Subsequently, an-
tibiotics of groups 2, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, and 15 were
classified further as broad-spectrum antibiotics.
Prior use of antibiotics was defined as use
within 15 days before acquisition of MRSA (for
those who were positive for MRSA), or 15 days
before ICU admission to the day of ICU discharge
(for those who were negative for MRSA).29 In-
vasive therapeutic procedures included use of cen-
tral venous catheters (CVCs), arterial catheters,
Port A catheters, endotracheal tubes, nasogas-
tric/nasoduodenal tubes, peripheral venous cath-
eters, thoracentesis, and paracentesis within 7
days prior to acquisition of MRSA (for these who
were positive for MRSA), or within the mean-
while from 7 days before ICU admission to the
day of ICU discharge (for those who were nega-
tive for MRSA). Recent operation was defined as:
(1) a simple procedure performed under local
anesthesia within 7 days prior to acquisition of
MRSA (for those who were positive for MRSA),
or within the  meanwhile from 7 days before ICU
admission to the day of ICU discharge (for those
who were negative for MRSA); or (2) an opera-
tion performed under general anesthesia within
30 days prior to acquisition of MRSA (for those
who were positive for MRSA), or within the
meanwhile from 30 days before ICU admission
to the day of ICU discharge (for those who were
negative for MRSA).30
Transmission of MRSA was defined as patients
being negative for MRSA on first active surveillance
culture upon admission to the ICU, but being pos-
itive for MRSA in the following active surveillance
cultures or the clinical cultures during their stay in
the ICU.
Statistical analysis
Statistical analysis was performed with SAS 9.1.3
(SAS Institute Inc., Cary, NC, USA). Continuous
variables were compared using Student’s t test.
Categorical variables were compared with a χ2 test
or, if the expected values were < 10, Fisher’s exact
test. The primary end point was the incidence of
MRSA transmission during ICU stay (new acquisi-
tion of MRSA). Nosocomial MRSA infection rates
were also compared. The method described by
Oleinick and Mantel was used to compare the in-
cidence in phases I and II.31 Predictors for acquisi-
tion of MRSA during ICU stay were identified
using a logistic regression model, by comparing
the characteristics of patients with newly acquired
MRSA (including new colonization and new infec-
tion) to those who were never positive for MRSA
by all active surveillance cultures and clinical cul-
tures while staying in the ICU. All parameters were
tested initially by univariate analysis. Parameters
with a p value less than 0.05 from the univariate
analysis were used for multivariate analysis. Param-
eters with collinearity (variance inflation > 10, as
determined by a linear regression model using the
VIF option in SAS) were not considered in the
final model simultaneously. A stepwise model
comparison and selection were used to determine
the final model of multiple variables analysis. All
tests were two-tailed and p < 0.05 was considered
statistically significant.
Results
Table 1 shows the demographic and clinical data
of the enrolled patients. Chronic renal insuffi-
ciency was the most common (79.4%) genitouri-
nary tract disease, and diabetes mellitus was the
most common (98.0%) endocrine disease. For
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Table 1. Demographic and clinical data of the enrolled patients*
Hospital A Hospital B
Parameters Phase I Phase II 
p
Phase I Phase II 
p
(n = 231) (n = 329) (n = 464) (n = 601)
Age (yr) 69.5 ± 13.8 69.5 ± 14.6 0.962 65.3 ± 17.8 66.6 ± 18.2 0.245
Sex, male:female 132:99 192:137 0.774 305:159 362:239 0.066
Length of stay (d) 10.1 ± 25.4 7.9 ± 8.9 0.352 9.8 ± 14.1 9.1 ± 11.7 0.383
APACHE II > 17 93 (40.3) 115 (35.0) 0.201 86 (18.5) 172 (28.6) < 0.001
Smoking 86 (37.2) 107 (32.5) 0.249 158 (34.1) 203 (33.8) 0.925
Diseases
Cardiovascular 123 (53.2) 205 (62.3) 0.033 270 (58.2) 350 (58.2) 0.988
Respiratory tract 35 (15.2) 43 (13.1) 0.484 113 (24.4) 161 (26.8) 0.367
Hepatobiliary tract 19 (8.2) 22 (6.7) 0.492 45 (9.7) 49 (8.2) 0.378
GU tract 55 (23.8) 61 (18.5) 0.130 127 (27.4) 192 (31.9) 0.106
GI tract 19 (8.2) 49 (14.9) 0.017 60 (12.9) 94 (15.6) 0.213
Mucocutaneous 2 (0.9) 0 0.091 1 (0.2) 0 0.255
Cerebrovascular 31 (13.4) 57 (17.3) 0.211 78 (16.8) 129 (21.5) 0.057
Endocrine 90 (39.0) 91 (27.7) 0.006 156 (15.4) 215 (35.8) 0.465
Autoimmune 3 (1.3) 3 (0.9) 0.662 1 (0.2) 1 (0.2) 0.854
Malignant 13 (5.6) 23 (7.0) 0.517 27 (5.8) 56 (9.3) 0.035
Immunodeficiency 0 0 0.854 2 (0.4) 8 (1.3) 0.131
Recent operation 12 (5.2) 8 (2.4) 0.083 208 (44.8) 292 (48.6) 0.223
CVC 62 (26.8) 111 (33.7) 0.082 265 (57.1) 368 (61.2) 0.175
Arterial line 94 (40.7) 186 (56.5) < 0.001 172 (37.1) 258 (42.9) 0.053
Nasogastric tube 80 (34.6) 169 (51.4) < 0.001 202 (43.5) 346 (57.6) < 0.001
Urinary catheters 91 (39.4) 187 (56.8) < 0.001 331 (71.3) 478 (79.5) 0.002
Endotracheal tube 61 (26.4) 116 (35.3) 0.027 181 (39.0) 304 (50.6) < 0.001
Antibiotics
Group 1 5 (2.2) 7 (2.1) 0.976 110 (23.7) 121 (20.1) 0.161
Group 2 24 (10.4) 35 (10.6) 0.925 51 (11.0) 130 (21.6) < 0.001
Group 3 25 (10.8) 50 (15.2) 0.135 30 (6.5) 25 (4.2) 0.092
Group 4 38 (16.5) 51 (15.5) 0.762 233 (50.2) 288 (47.9) 0.458
Group 5 66 (28.6) 93 (28.3) 0.937 28 (6.0) 62 (10.3) 0.013
Group 6 43 (19.5) 80 (24.3) 0.109 54 (11.6) 50 (8.3) 0.071
Group 7 3 (1.3) 19 (5.8) 0.007 47 (10.1) 25 (4.2) 0.000
Group 8 8 (3.5) 7 (2.1) 0.335 26 (5.6) 36 (6.0) 0.789
Group 9 3 (1.3) 12 (3.6) 0.090 32 (6.9) 62 (10.3) 0.051
Group 10 8 (3.5) 1 (0.3) 0.003 0 1 (0.2) 0.379
Group 11 25 (10.8) 36 (10.9) 0.964 86 (18.5) 101 (16.7) 0.462
Group 12 38 (16.5) 66 (20.1) 0.279 65 (14.0) 92 (15.3) 0.553
Group 13 22 (9.5) 33 (10.0) 0.843 171 (36.9) 254 (42.3) 0.074
Group 14 5 (2.2) 9 (2.7) 0.670 41 (8.8) 52 (8.7) 0.916
Group 15 37 (16.1) 80 (24.3) 0.017 96 (20.7) 116 (19.3) 0.574
*Data presented as mean ± standard deviation or n(%). APACHE II = Acute Physiology and Chronic Health Evaluation II; GU = genitouri-
nary; GI = gastrointestinal; CVC = central venous catheter.
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patients in hospital A, more patients in phase I
consumed alcohol, had endocrine diseases, and
used monobactams. More patients in phase II
had cardiovascular and gastrointestinal diseases;
used arterial lines, nasogastric and endotracheal
tubes, and used third-generation cephalosporins
with anti-pseudomonal effects (Group 7), and
fluoroquinolones (Group 15). In hospital B, more
patients in phase I used third-generation cepha-
losporins with anti-pseudomonal effects (Group
7). More patients in phase II had APACHE II
scores > 17, underlying malignancy; use of naso-
gastric tubes, urinary catheters and endotracheal
tubes; and use of anti-pseudomonal penicillins
(Group 2) and second-generation cephalosporins
(Group 5).
During phase I, we screened 695 patients (1309
patient-times in total). The proportion of surveil-
lance cultures missed was 5.6%. The total num-
ber of patient days for both ICUs was 6286. A
total of 234 patients (33.7%) were positive for
MRSA through active surveillance. Only 50 pa-
tients, all of whom belonged to those identified
by surveillance cultures, were found positive for
MRSA through routine culture of clinical speci-
mens. Among the 234 MRSA-positive patients,
184 were found to have been positive for MRSA
by active surveillance at ICU admission (which
indicated that they had carried MRSA at the time
of admission to the ICU). The other 50 patients
(13 in hospital A and 37 in hospital B) acquired
MRSA during their stays in the ICU. The time lag
from ICU admission to acquisition of MRSA for
the 13 patients in hospital A was 9.6 ± 8.5 days,
and that for the 37 patients in hospital B was
13.0 ± 14.4 days. During this phase, there were
15 episodes of nosocomial MRSA infections in
these two ICUs (Table 2).
During phase II, we screened 930 patients
(2249 patient-times in total). The proportion of
surveillance cultures missed was 4.5%. The total
number of patient days for both ICUs was 6743.
Two hundred and seventy-three patients (29.4%)
were positive for MRSA through active surveil-
lance. Only 59 patients, all of whom belonged 
to those identified by surveillance cultures, were
positive for MRSA through routine culture of clin-
ical specimens. Among these 273 MRSA-positive
patients, 210 were found to have been positive by
active surveillance for MRSA at admission to the
ICU. The other 63 patients (18 in hospital A and
45 in hospital B) acquired MRSA during their
stay in the ICU. The time lag from admission to
ICU to acquisition of MRSA for the 18 patients
in hospital A was 9.4 ± 8.7 days, and that for 
the 45 patients in hospital B was 10.8 ± 8.2 days.
During this phase, there were 16 episodes of
nosocomial MRSA infections in these two ICUs
(Table 2). All patients with nosocomial MRSA
infection were found to be carriers of MRSA by
active surveillance at 3–21 days before the devel-
opment of infection.
Table 2. Patients positive for methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus in hospitals A and B*
Hospital A Hospital B
Phase I Phase II Phase I Phase II
Patients screened 231 329 464 601
Patient-times screened 514 731 895 1563
Episodes of MRSA infections 2 1 13 15
Patients positive for MRSA 74 (32.0) 76 (23.1) 160 (34.5) 197 (32.7)
Acquired before ICU 61 (26.4) 58 (17.6) 123 (26.5) 152 (25.3)
Acquired in ICU 13 (7.6)† 18 (6.6)† 37 (10.8)† 45 (10.0)†
Time lag from admission to 9.6 ± 8.5 9.4 ± 8.7 13.0 ± 14.4 10.8 ± 8.2
acquiring MRSA (d)
*Data presented as n, n (%) or mean ± standard deviation; †number of patients at risk, not the total number screened. MRSA =
Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus; ICU = intensive care unit.
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Nasal carriage of MRSA by healthcare workers
did not differ significantly between the two phases
(hospital A: 8/32 vs. 7/25, p = 0.768; hospital B:
14/55 vs. 11/58, p = 0.507).
Table 3 shows the incidence of MRSA trans-
mission during phases I and II in both hospitals.
A comparison of phases I and II indicated no 
significant differences in the incidence of MRSA
transmission (hospital A, p = 0.940; hospital B,
p = 0.810), MRSA infection (hospital A, p = 0.719;
hospital B, p = 0.932), and the time lag from ad-
mission to the ICU to acquiring MRSA (hospital
A, p = 0.96; hospital B, p = 0.42).
Among the 507 patients who were positive
through active surveillance for MRSA, 90.9% had
positive nasal swab cultures, 87.5% had positive
sputum or throat swab cultures, 62.6% had posi-
tive axillary swab cultures, 71.1% had positive per-
ineal swab cultures, and 11.8% had positive wound
cultures.
There were 420 MRSA isolates collected in phase
I and 415 in phase II available for drug susceptibility
tests. Susceptibility to chloramphenicol was 54.1%
in phase I and 55.2% in phase II; ciprofloxacin,
17.8% and 14.8%; clindamycin, 15.5% and 18.8%;
erythromycin, 4.8% and 4.0%; gentamicin, 13.3%
and 10.6%; linezolid, 100% and 100%; rifampin,
88.8% and 77.6%; teicoplanin, 100% and 100%;
tetracycline, 21.9% and 24.6%; sulfamethoxazole,
32.1% and 32.3%; and vancomycin, 100% and
100%. There was no significant difference in the
drug susceptibilities between the two phases.
To determine adherence of healthcare workers
to contact precautions, we made 701 observations.
For hospital A, the adherence rates for washing
hands using antiseptics before entering a private
room or cohort area, washing hands using anti-
septics after leaving a private room or cohort area,
putting on gloves before entering a private room
or cohort area, taking off gloves after leaving a
private room or cohort area, putting on gowns
before entering a private room or cohort area, and
taking off gowns after leaving a private room or
cohort area were 63.3%, 81.8%, 83.8%, 80.2%,
87.4%, and 88.2%, respectively. The corresponding
rates for hospital B were 33.1%, 52.2%, 64.8%,
42.1%, 67.1%, and 67.3%, respectively.
Univariate analysis determined that the follow-
ing factors increased the risk of acquisition of
MRSA (Table 4): prolonged ICU stay; female sex;
high APACHE II score at admission; use of CVCs,
nasogastric tubes and endotracheal tubes; respi-
ratory tract, genitourinary tract and endocrine
diseases; recent operation; use of penicillin com-
bined with β-lactamase inhibitors; and use of
second-generation cephalosporins, glycopeptides,
aminoglycosides, fluoroquinolones, and broad-
spectrum antibiotics. Active surveillance plus con-
tact isolation was not a significant factor (odds
ratio, 0.884; 95% confidence interval, 0.599–
1.306; p = 0.540). Multivariate analysis indicated
that prolonged ICU stay and the presence of res-
piratory tract diseases were independent risk fac-
tors for acquiring MRSA in the ICU (Table 5).
Table 3. Incidence of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus transmission and infection in both 
hospitals A and B
Hospital A Hospital B
Phase I Phase II p Phase I Phase II p
Total patient days (d) 2009 2607 4528 5440
Patient days at risk for 1354 1803 2659 3329
acquiring MRSA (d)
Incidence of MRSA 1.00 0.38 0.719 2.87 2.76 0.932
infection (%)
Incidence of MRSA 9.60 9.98 0.940 13.92 13.52 0.810
transmission (%)
MRSA = Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus.
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Discussion
The present study demonstrated that ASI did 
not reduce the transmission of MRSA and MRSA
infection in ICU patients in two Taiwanese hos-
pitals. For our ICU patients, the overall preva-
lence rate of MRSA carriage was 31.2%. However,
the incidence of nosocomial MRSA infection was
low: 0.65 per 1000 patient days in hospital A, and
2.81 per 1000 patient days in hospital B. Only
21.5% patients who carried MRSA could be iden-
tified using routine clinical cultures. Nasal swab
cultures had the higher yield rate to find MRSA
carriage.
Some previous studies have suggested that
ASI reduces the transmission of MRSA,8,10,12 and
two major guidelines to control nosocomial in-
fection advocate the use of ASI.3,5 However, the
studies of Cepeda et al and Harbarth et al have
shown that implementation of these procedures
had no effect.11,13 The different conclusions of
these studies might have been the result of differ-
ences in study design, simultaneous application
of other interventions (e.g. chlorhexidine bathing
and topical mupirocin) other than ASI, differ-
ences in patient populations, and differences in
the baseline prevalence of MRSA.
Despite the controversies about the effective-
ness of ASI, we can suggest five reasons for the
negative results in our study. First, we did not
adopt preemptive isolation for patients who were
newly admitted to the ICU. According to the sur-
veillance results, 77.7% of patients who were
positive for MRSA carried MRSA upon ICU admis-
sion. In this study, it took about 3 days to obtain
culture results, which was similar to the routine
practices in Taiwanese hospitals. Therefore, it is
possible that transmission of MRSA to patients
Table 4. Risk factors for acquiring methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus during intensive care unit stay
Variables Odds ratio (95% confidence interval) p
Length of stay in ICU 1.089 (1.071–1.108) < 0.001
Sex, male to female 0.663 (0.450–0.977) 0.038
APACHE II score > 17 4.008 (2.317–6.934) < 0.001
Central venous catheters 1.808 (1.078–3.033) 0.025
Nasogastric tube 3.740 (2.163–6.465) < 0.001
Endotracheal tube 2.412 (1.381–4.218) 0.002
Respiratory tract diseases 2.762 (1.787–4.268) < 0.001
Genitourinary tract diseases 1.605 (1.028–2.506) 0.037
Endocrine diseases 2.042 (1.334–3.125) 0.001
Recent operation 2.017 (1.365–2.979) 0.000
Group 3 antibiotics 2.037 (1.109–3.742) 0.022
Group 5 antibiotics 2.167 (1.292–3.634) 0.003
Group 11 antibiotics 2.057 (1.163–3.639) 0.013
Group 13 antibiotics 2.248 (1.373–3.681) 0.001
Group 15 antibiotics 2.425 (1.478–3.980) < 0.001
Broad-spectrum antibiotics 5.450 (3.249–9.143) < 0.001
ICU = Intensive care unit; APACHE II = Acute Physiology and Chronic Health Evaluation II.
Table 5. Risk factors for acquiring methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus during intensive care unit stay
Variables Odds ratio (95% confidence interval) p
Length of stay in ICU 1.072 (1.045–1.099) < 0.001
Respiratory tract diseases 2.066 (1.092–3.910) 0.026
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negative for MRSA on admission from those who
carried MRSA on admission occurred during this
time interval. However, universal preemptive iso-
lation for all patients admitted to ICUs is not
generally acceptable to most Taiwanese hospi-
tals.19 Second, we did not use intranasal mupirocin
and chlorhexidine bathing to reduce the colo-
nization pool. This procedure has been reported
previously as being effective in reducing MRSA
colonization and infection.7 A nasal preparation
of mupirocin is currently not available in Taiwan,
and chlorhexidine bathing is not acceptable to
Taiwanese patients and their families at the pres-
ent time.19 Third, the prevalence of MRSA carriage
among ICU patients (31.2%) was much higher
in our study than in previous studies from other
countries (11.4–15.7%).6–8 The high prevalence
of MRSA among our patients might have led to 
a higher overall probability of transmission.14
Fourth, more of the patients in phase II of our
study had significant clinical conditions, in par-
ticular high APACHE II scores, use of devices,
and underlying diseases, compared with those in
phase I. Patients with more complicated clinical
conditions might have a higher risk of acquiring
MRSA. Fifth, adherence of our healthcare workers
to contact precautions was not good. A breach in
isolation precautions unquestionably increases
the risk of MRSA transmission.
Our study also showed that ASI did not de-
crease nosocomial MRSA infections in ICU pa-
tients. In addition to the reasons listed above, 
a low MRSA infection rate (0.65 per 1000 patient
days at hospital A, and 2.8 per 1000 patient days at
hospital B) compared with that in United States
hospitals (2.0–8.9 per 1000 patient days) was
found in the present study.14,32 The cases of noso-
comial infection in our two ICUs were defined ac-
cording to the United States Centers for Disease
Prevention and Control.33 Therefore, the possi-
bility of underestimating the MRSA infection was
less likely. The low baseline MRSA infection rate
might be a possible factor hindering the impact
of ASI. Furthermore, a recent report by Robicsek
et al demonstrated that surveillance cultures in
ICUs alone do not result in a decrease in MRSA 
infections, but universal surveillance of the whole
hospital does decrease infection.32 This might also
partly explain the negative results of our study, be-
cause a large proportion of our patients who were
positive for MRSA were positive at the time of ICU
admission, which indicated that they were likely to
have acquired MRSA in other wards of the hospi-
tal. In addition, the nosocomial MRSA infection
rates were much higher in the ICU of hospital B in
phase I of the study compared with those noted
from 2000 to 2004. It might be possible that, if ac-
tive surveillance were not conducted, the nosoco-
mial MRSA infection rate in the ICU of hospital 
B would continue to increase. Therefore, active
surveillance might, in fact, have been helpful in
controlling the nosocomial MRSA infection rate in
the ICU of hospital B. However, this phenome-
non could not be demonstrated in the ICU of
hospital A.
Compared with hospitals in the United States,
we noted a higher prevalence of MRSA carriage,
but a lower MRSA infection rate. This finding is
worthy of further study.
Our finding that routine clinical cultures de-
tected only 21.5% of the MRSA colonization pool
is similar to that (15%) reported by Salgado 
et al.9 Previously reported risk factors for acquir-
ing MRSA have included use of systemic antibi-
otics, prior residence in a long-term care facility,
prior hospitalization, prior operation, need for
dialysis, use of CVCs or long-term venous access
devices, and use of urinary tract catheters.34 We
identified prolonged ICU stay and presence of
respiratory diseases as the two independent risk
factors for acquiring MRSA. It seems obvious
that a prolonged ICU stay will increase the risk
for acquiring MRSA. Presumably, the presence of
respiratory diseases might facilitate colonization
or infection of the airway with MRSA as a result
of a breach in the defensive barriers of the nor-
mal airway.
In conclusion, our study demonstrated that ASI
did not reduce MRSA transmission and infection
among ICU patients in two Taiwanese hospitals
where there was a high prevalence of MRSA. The
negative results of ASI could reflect the current 
Active surveillance and isolation of MRSA
J Formos Med Assoc | 2010 • Vol 109 • No 4 267
situation in Taiwanese hospitals, where a relative
low adherence rate to isolation precaution by
healthcare workers was present, and limited re-
sources compromised the implementation of
other adjuvant infection control interventions.
In addition, the major burden of nosocomial in-
fections in Taiwan currently is caused by drug-
resistant Gram-negative bacilli.35 ASI for MRSA
might not have a high priority as a mandatory
infection control measure in Taiwan before the
situation changes.36 Prolonged ICU stay and the
presence of respiratory diseases were independ-
ent risk factors for acquiring MRSA in ICUs.
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